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There is an extensive literature on the economics of fisheries management, but
only a very small part deals with enforcement issues. The question of which types
of controls will meet economic efficiency or other objectives has received con-
siderable attention. (Crutchfield 1961; Rettig and Ginter 1978; Pearse 1979; Stur-
gess and Meany 1982; and Anderson 1986, Chapter 6). The question of how non-
compliance, avoidance and other illegal activities, and enforcement costs affect
the economically efficient level of fishing and the relative efficiency of the various
control types has only recently been analyzed. (Sutinen and Andersen 1985; An-
derson and Lee 1986; and Milliman 1986). However, the problem of selecting and
optimally implementing a management regime taking into account limited agency
budgets has not been analyzed. That is, we do not have a rigorous analysis of
how fisheries agencies rationally can go about the business of managing fisheries.
The purpose of this paper is to fill that void. The discussion will be in terms of
an autonomous agency with considerable flexibility because this will facilitate a
general discussion. In those instances where flexibility is limited by legislative
mandate, the agencies will have constraints other than those described below. In
those instances where regulation activities are spread over several agencies (i.e.,
management councils set quotas but the Coast Guard does the enforcement) the
analysis here must be thought of as the operation of a cooperative interagency
task force. From the discussion, however, the problems which may arise if such
cooperation does not exist is easy to discern. Further research on the economics
of noncooperative agency behavior would be useful.
The paper will proceed as follows. First, following Anderson and Lee (1986)
the management problem from the agency's perspective is discussed by describing
the actual types of control variables. Then the less than direct relationship between
agency control variables and fishing industry behavior and its importance in prac-
tical policy is described. The final section analyzes the economic problem of
running a fishing agency. A mathematical analysis of the problem is left to an
Appendix, which, among other things, lists the relationships that will be important
in undertaking proper management.
What Are the Control Variables?
Although in most formal fisheries economics models, the control variable is either
fishing effort or fishing mortality, and sometimes the size at first capture, in ac-
123124 Lee G, Anderson
tuality these are only indirectly controlled by fisheries agencies. The only things
that agencies can directly control are the governing instrument, the monitoring
procedure, and in some cases, the type of penalty, as well as the levels of each
of these activities or instruments. Industry behavior with respect to effort, mor-
tality, etc., is controlled by the way individual firms react to the control instru-
ments selected and the way they are implemented.
The first control variable is the choice of governing instrument. There are
many particular types from which to choose: input controls, closed seasons,
closed areas, individual transferable quotas, limited licenses, etc. Once an in-
strument (or a combination of several) has been selected, it is necessary to de-
termine the level at which it is to be operated. For example: Which should the
total quota be? How many licenses should be issued?
Determining the type and level of the governing instrument, however, will not
by itself change fishermen's behavior. The program must be monitored and hence
the second control variable is the type of monitoring procedure. Here again, there
is a wide range from which to choose: dockside, sea surface, or aerial observation,
reviewing financial or other records, etc. Once a monitoring program has been
selected, it is necessary to determine its extent of use, which usually is a decision
based on the amounts and types of resources that will be allocated to it.
The third control variable is the penalty structure. Fven with monitoring or
enforcement, there will be no change in industry behavior if there is no penalty
for deviant behavior. Possible choices are jail terms, boat or gear confiscations,
forfeiture of catch, and fines. Again, once the type of penalty has been chosen it
is necessary to determine the level. That is: How high should the fine be? How
long should the jail sentence be?
In summary, fisheries agencies only indirectly control industry behavior and
they do so by selecting a combination of governing instrument, monitoring pro-
gram, and penalty structure. Further, the controls open to a management agency
can be thought of as fixed and variable. The fixed controls are the particular
instrument, program, and structure while the variable controls are the level at
which each is set. The operational goal of a fisheries management agency should
be to select the proper combination of fixed controls and to use them at the
appropriate levels such that, given their budget constraint, the optimum industry
behavior change can be accomplished.
The Relationship Between Control Variables and Fishing Behavior
As pointed out above, a fishery agency only indirectly controls industry behavior
by the choice and implementation of governing instrument, monitoring program,
and penalty. For purposes here, assume that fishing behavior can be measured
by fishing effort, denoted by E. With no regulation, the equilibrium level of effort
will depend upon the price offish (i.e., the demand curve), the cost of producing
effort, and the relationship between harvest and effort which is determined by
the biological productivity of the stock. In its simplest form, this equilibrium can
be thought of as the intersection of a total revenue curve and a total cost curve
in the Schaefer analysis (Gordon 1954, and Anderson 1986, Chapter 2). A change
in price, cost, or biological productivity will change the open-access equilibrium
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The motivating forces behind fishermen's behavior do not change under reg-
ulation. Each will still try to maximize profits. The only difference is that they
must now do so given the constraints imposed by the regulation program. The
individual firm will continue to produce extra units of effort as long as it is privately
profitable to do so. With regulation, however, they also may find it profitable to
undertake regulation avoidance activities which make it more difficult to detect
prohibited fishing behavior. Avoidance activities can be anything from underre-
porting catch to subterfuges such as fishing or landing fish at night or the use of
remote ports or fishing grounds. It is a separate activity from producing fishing
effort and firms will allocate resources to it as long as the returns (increased illegal
catch or reduction in penalties) are greater than the resource cost to engage in it.
Individual fishing firms will select that combination of effort and avoidance ac-
tivities that maximize profits given the nature of the existing regulation regime.
To completely understand the profit maximizing behavior of regulated fishing
firms, it is important to realize that it is directly related to success of the monitoring
program in detecting deviate or prohibited behavior. In general, the amount of
otherwise restricted fishing that is detected will be a function of how much is
produced, and the amount of avoidance activity (both under the control of indi-
vidual firms), as will the allowable level and the amount of monitoring activity
(both under the control of the management agency). This can be expressed as
follows:
C^ = C° ( C, A, C, m ) ^^^
Let C"-" be the amount of a particular control variable that is actually detected,
C the level that is actually produced by the fishery, and C the allowable level of
the variable. For example, if the control variable was a quota, C would equal
actual catch, C the allowable catch, and C° the measured catch. The terms A
and m refer to the amount of avoidance activity and monitoring, respectively.
The signs in parentheses represent the likely sign of the first derivative with re-
spect to that variable.
The detection function will be different for various control instruments. For
example, catch restrictions are easier to monitor than are area closures or are
gear restrictions when more than one type of gear is allowed on the boat. There-
fore, Equation (1) emphasizes a very important aspect of management. Although
there has been little or no research on the nature of the detection function, it is
an integral part of applied fisheries management. To be specific, certain control
variables which look good in theory may have a detection function such that the
percentage of detected output to the allowable output is very low at any level of
monitoring, and, as such, will not likely be successful.
The detection function is important for the individual fisherman because it
determines the level of penalties and hence, their profit maximizing combination
of effort and avoidance activities. The penalties to the fishing firm will be a func-
tion of the difference between the detected and the allowable amount of the control
variable. Taking this into account, the fishing firm will produce marginal units of
effort as long as the value of the catch is greater than the sum of the harvesting
cost and the expected penalty cost. At the same time, it will be produce avoidance
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the reduction in penalty payments. For a more detailed discussion of this see
Anderson and Lee, 1984.
Given the above behavior on the part of individual firms, the aggregate reg-
ulated equilibrium level of effort and avoidance activity will depend upon the
price of fish, the cost of harvesting, the biological productivity of the stock, as
well as on the allowable level of the control variable, the amount of monitoring,
and the size of the penalty or fine. Therefore, if price, cost, and biological pro-
ductivity remain constant, it follows that the equilibrium regulated level of effort
and avoidance are indirectly determined by the a£tions of the agency. In terms
of the above notation, the agency directly controls C, m, and K, and the individual
firms choose their profit maximizing combination of E and A accordingly. There-
fore, the agency will indirectly control E and A as represented in Equations (2)
and (3).
E = E( C, m, K, X)
A = A ( C, m, K, X) (3)
The X term represents fish stock size. Its presence in these equations is interesting
because this implies that the effectiveness^f the actual control variables depends
upon stock size. For any combination of C, m, and K, the higher the stock, the
higher the returns to fishing, and, hence, the higher the actual effort and the level
of avoidance activity will be. The signs in parentheses represent the likely sign
of derivatives. The effect of a change in avoidance activity is particularly inter-
esting. In all likelihood avoidance will first increase but then decrease with m.
Avoidance will be zero with no enforcement (noncompliance may be high, but
there will be no incentive to distort the perceived amount of the control variable
because there is no monitoring). It will initially increase with m, however, because
monitoring increases the chances of detection and it may be privately productive
to reduce the detected portion of the controlled output. Ultimately, however,
avoidance activity will fall back to zero as monitoring increases because it will
increase the chance of being caught enough that the productivity of detection
avoidance decreases.
Again there has been little research on the nature of these relationships, but
if a fishery agency hopes to regulate with any degree of accuracy it has to know
what effects different policies will actually have on industry behavior. Knowledge
of these functions will help them to determine which control variables are more
suitable to their particular problems.
Before moving on to the next section, several comments concerning avoidance
activity are in order. These activities are important for two related reasons. First,
if economic efficiency is important in fisheries management, then it is necessary
to take into account the degree to which any control program will encourage
avoidance activity. The cost of such activities is really an implicit cost of the
program in the sense that resources producing goods and services elsewhere in
the economy are directed to the fishery. The unfortunate thing about these costs
is that there are no net offsetting benefits. They merely allow the industry to
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program is trying to correct. In the literature, these uses have been called directly
unproductive profit-seeking activities (Bhagwati 1983). Second, avoidance ac-
tivities are important because they can affect the general overall productivity of
a management regime. That is, while they have no socially beneficial effects, the
private benefits of reduced detections lowers the potential benefits to be gained
from a management program.
The Economics of Management Agency Operation
The basics of the economics of agency operation can be most easily presented in
terms of a specific problem. The problem is described and analyzed in some detail
in the Appendix. The purpose here will be to discuss the common sense results
of that formal analysis.
Consider a management agency which has two independent fisheries under its
control. Its goal is to optimally manage these fisheries given the budget allotted
to it by the legislature. Assume, as is most likely, that the legislature also deter-
mines the nature and extent of the penalty program, which for purposes here will
be a fine. This then only leaves two of the three control variables in the hands
of the agency, which of course will have an effect on their overall efficiency.
Assume also that the objective of management is the maximization of the present
value of output although any other quantifiable objective would do as well.' In
terms of the above discussion, the problem facing the agency is to select the proper
combination of governing instrument and monitoring device and then select the
optimal leyel of both. This must be viewed as a stepwise problem, however. First,
for each of the possible combinations of governing instrument and monitoring
device, the level of each which generates the highest net present value must be
found and the net gain noted. The second step is to select from all relevant pairs
of governing instrument and monitoring device the combination which, when used
optimally, will generate the highest net benefits.
Consider first the problem of optimal management for a given combination of
governing instrument and monitoring device. The issue here is to select the ap-
propriate level of each control variable given the budget constraints. To make the
problem more tractable at this level of discussion, assume that the cost associated
with each governing instrument is fixed. In this case the reduced problem is to
determine how to allocate the discretionary funds (i.e., the total budget minus
the fixed cost of the governing instrument) toward monitoring the two fisheries.
This fixed cost assumption will be too restrictive in cases such as a quota where
the reliability of estimated allowable catches may well vary with research costs.
In that instance it would be necessary to optimally allocate the budget between
research and monitoring for the two fisheries.
The first order conditions for the solution to the problem as stated are pre-
sented in Equations (Al) to (A4) in the Appendix. The optimal level of the gov-
erning instrument for either of the fisheries is where the increase in marginal net
value to the fishery due to the change in effort which results from the change in
the level of the governing instrument is equal to the marginal avoidance cost
generated. (See Equations (Al) and (A2)). That is, changing the level of the gov-
' See Milliman (1986) for a discussion of appropriate maximands when there is the pos-
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erning instrument will have an effect on the actual output of effort produced which
will in turn affect the level of benefits generated by the fishery. At the same time,
however, changing the level of the governing instrument will also change avoid-
ance costs indirectly through its effect on the motivation of the individual fish-
ermen to use resources to avoid detection. Only if the marginal gain in value of
output is positive and greater than the marginal avoidance costs does it make
sense to change the level of the governing instrument. Note that there is no agency
cost per se involved here. Since programmatic costs are assumed fixed, changes
in the size of the control variable (i.e., the size of a quota), will not affect man-
agement costs. The only costs are the indirect effect on industry avoidance costs.
The point is, however, even though these costs will never show up in an audit of
agency books, they must be considered in determining the optimal management
program.
The problem of determining the optimal level of monitoring is different, how-
ever. First, there is an actual agency cost, and second, there is a budget constraint.
Looking at each fishery independently for a moment, optimal monitoring occurs
when the last dollar spent on monitoring yields at least a dollar's worth of net
benefits. The marginal net benefit from monitoring is the change in the value of
harvest minus the change in avoidance costs. See Equations (A3) and (A4). In
general, an increase in monitoring will reduce illegal effort and, therefore, reduce
the waste of overfishing (causing a positive gain), but it will also either increase
or decrease avoidance costs.
If, before the uncommitted budget is exhausted, a point is reached where the
last dollar spent on monitoring produces a dollar's worth of benefits and further
increases in monitoring will produce lower benefits, monitoring activities should
be fixed at that level, and in the confines of this small model, any remaining funds
should be returned to the treasury. The budget constraint is not binding, and
further monitoring will result in net losses.
However, if there are not enough funds to push the net benefit from a dollar's
worth of monitoring in both fisheries to a dollar, there is a binding budget con-
straint. Without question, this is how agency directors view their positions. In
this case, the discretionary dollars must be allocated to the monitoring of the two
fisheries such that net benefits are maximized. In policy terms this means that
otherwise independent fisheries become interdependents from an agency per-
spective because a dollar spent on one fishery is not available to be spent on the
other. The optimum allocation of the fixed budget will occur where the net benefit
for the last dollar spent in monitoring in both fisheries is equal. If the net marginal
benefit is not the same in both fisheries, total benefits can be increased by shifting
a dollar from the fishery where the net benefits are lower to the one where they
are higher.
All else equal, the above analysis means that those fisheries with lower avoid-
ance costs, lower harvest costs, and higher values of output will be the ones where
it is more profitable to use available monitoring funds because monitoring them
will produce higher benefits. In certain instances, it may be that the entire mon-
itoring budget should be spent on only one fishery because the returns of even
the first unit of monitoring in a lower valued fishery may not be as high as the
returns to the last dollar spent on the more profitable fishery at the point where
all monitoring funds are spent on the latter.
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argument can be made concerning funds from the general treasury. Since the last
dollar spent on monitoring on either fishery generates more than a dollar's worth
of benefits, it will make economic sense to increase the agency budget provided
it is used on monitoring.
This completes the analysis of the optimal management given a specified com-
bination of governing instrument and monitoring device. There are, however,
many combinations of instruments and management devices that could be used,
especially with more than one fishery to manage. If the above conditions are
achieved for a particular combination, net benefits (i.e., the difference between
gross benefits and the sum of the fixed programmatic cost for the governing in-
strument and the discretionary funds used on monitoring) will be as large as pos-
sible given that combination and budget constraint. A similar analysis is necessary
for all relevant combinations so that the agency can select the one which produces
the highest net benefit.
Summary
The similarities of the above to the microeconomic theory of the firm is obvious.
While a management agency is not trying to maximize profits per se, if it is to
operate optimally it must engage in maximizing behavior. And while doing so it
must take into account the nature of its indirect control over industry behavior
(see Equations (1), (2), and (3)) and its budget constraint. In one sense the control
relationships may be thought of as the agency's production function. It can be
seen from this analysis that while the level of the governing instrument (i.e., how
high should the quota be) commonly receives the most attention in policy debates,
more properly the focus should be on a wider range of control variables. In par-
ticular, the type and amount of monitoring is very important. In many ways,
monitoring is the real driving force behind management. Further, it is very im-
portant when it comes to the proper allocation of agency budgets. The agency
must allocate the limited budget appropriately between different fisheries. It can-
not be stressed enough that there is more than one control variable for fisheries
management, and discussions which ignore the complete range of variables open
to an agency unnecessarily limit the focus and hence the chances of achieving
optimal management.
It is also important to note that the net benefit of any management regime is
a function of many variables. The literature has clearly shown that one difference
between quotas, gear restrictions, closed areas, etc., on the one hand and those
instruments which try to limit effort (i.e., taxes, transferable individual quotas,
etc.) on the other, is the efficiency with which effort is produced (Rettig and Ginter
1978; Pearse 1979; and Sturgess and Meany 1982). This analysis, however, shows
that ease of enforcement and the effect on avoidance behavior are also important
for the overall efficiency of a management program. In this light, the former group
of instruments, their production inefficiencies notwithstanding, may not be as
undesirable in an overall sense as commonly believed.
Appendix
Many of the problems faced by fisheries management agencies can be described
in terms of the following example. Assume the agency manages two independent^^0 Lee G, Anderson
stocks offish, red fish and blue fish. Each are regulated by an allowable effort
program. The agency has a budget from which it must pay the programmatic costs
of the controlled effort program, which are assumed fixed, and the costs of mon-
itoring, which depend upon the amount of monitoring applied to each fishery. The
problem for the agency is to select the appropriate levels of allowable effort in
the two fisheries and to allocate the uncommitted funds (i.e., those not used from
programmatic costs) to monitoring the two stocks. Further, these decisions should
be made such that the present value of harvest is maximized subject to the con-
straint that total monitoring expenses cannot be greater than the monitoring
budget. With a fixed price for both types of fish, the value of harvest in any one
year expressed a function of agency control variables is:
Fy^[E^(E^ m^ k^) - X""] - c^(E'-) - YA'(W, m^ k^ XO
+ P^''[E^ m^ k"), X"] - C''(E'') - 7''Ab(E'', m^ k^ X") - m^ - m"
where P' = price of fish
y' = harvest of stock i
E' = actual amount of effort in fishery i
E' = the allowable amount of effort in fishery i
m' = the dollar amount spent on enforcement in fishery i
k' = size of fine in fishery i (assumed fixed by the legislative)
X' = stock size for stock i
c' = cost function of effort for fishery i
7' = unit avoidance cost for fishery i
A' = amount of avoidance for fishery i
The E'[ ] and the A'[ ] functions are the effort and avoidance functions which
show the indirect relationship between industry behavior and agency controls.
See Equations (2) and (3) above.
The relevant first order conditions for an interior solution to the constrained
Hamiltonian for this problem are:
^r - 7^A^ = 0 (Al)
Inr - YA'ir.r - 1 = \ (A2)
|. - 7bA^ = 0 (A3)
^b - 7''A^b - 1 = \ (A4)
In all cases the subscripts refer to first derivatives. In Equations (A2) and (A4)
the \ term on the right-hand side is the Lagrangian multiplier for the monitoring
budget constraint. The term in brackets represents the marginal net value of a
unit of effort applied to a particular fishery. It has been expressed thus for no-
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= (Pi - ^i) yb - cki (A5)
The term ^i can be interpreted as the shadow price of a unit of stock in place
(Clark 1976, Chapter 4). Thus, the marginal net value of a unit of effort is the net
marginal value of harvest (market price minus shadow price times marginal prod-
uct of effort) minus the cost of production.
Equations (Al) and (A3) imply that the level of the control variable E' should
be increased as long as the gain which results (which depends upon the change
in the actual level of effort produced due to a change in the control variable and
the size of the MNVE) is equal to the marginal avoidance costs that are brought
forth from the industry.
Equations (A2) and (A4) imply that the monitoring funds should be allocated
to the various stocks until the marginal returns to the last dollar spent on each
stock are equal. The marginal return to monitoring is the product of change in
actual E due to a change in monitoring times the MNVE minus the resultant
avoidance costs generated. In no case, however, should monitoring be used to
the extent that marginal returns become less than a dollar. In that case, the budget
is not binding on the maximization process and excess funds (i.e., those affected
will have negative net returns) should not be used.
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